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FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE 
MEMBER STATES’ INDIRECT USE OF EXTRAORDINARY 
RENDITION AND THE EU COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY 
FLORIAN GEYER
* 
Introduction 
The expression ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ is a set term in Anglo-American common law. It 
stands in the context of unlawful investigations, searches and seizures and the question of 
whether ‘neutral’ information based on unlawfully gathered evidence can be admissible in court 
proceedings. The ratio of the metaphor is evident: if the source of the evidence (the tree) is 
tainted, then anything deriving from it (the fruit) bears the same flaw. To give an example: if 
during an unlawful search investigators find a key to a post office box containing a crucial 
document which might prove the defendant’s guilt, this document will – as a rule – not be 
admissible as evidence in court proceedings since it is just one product of the unlawful search. 
To stick to the metaphor: the document is the fruit of the poisonous tree. Established in 1920 by 
the US Supreme Court in its decision Silverthorne Lumber CO. vs. US,
1 this rule has been 
subject to certain restrictions and exceptions, but – in principle – still governs US police and 
criminal evidence law.  
The doctrine – with its highly symbolic allusion to temptation and its mediated, prolonged 
effects – fits only too well with the topic of this paper – though is understood in a wider sense 
here. The issue at stake is the EU member states’ indirect, second-hand use of situations and 
‘possibilities’ created by extraordinary renditions and unlawful detentions, as opposed to their 
direct complicity or silent consent in secret US intelligence activities.
2 The resolution of the 
European Parliament (EP) on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, as adopted by the plenary on 14 February 2007
3 
                                                      
* Florian Geyer is Research Fellow at the Justice and Home Affairs unit of CEPS and Ph.D. candidate at 
the University of Trier. This paper falls within the scope of the CHALLENGE project – the Changing 
Landscape of European Liberty and Security, funded by the Sixth EU Framework Programme of DG 
Research, European Commission, see www.libertysecurity.org. The paper is based on a presentation 
delivered at the CHALLENGE Thematic Seminar on ‘Human Rights, extraordinary renditions & irregular 
migration: challenges for the EU’ held the 19 March 2007 at CEPS in Brussels. The author would like to 
thank Elspeth Guild, Daniel Gros, Peter Hobbing and Sergio Carrera for their valuable comments. 
1 251 US 385 (1920); it received its name some years later in Nardone vs. US, 308 US 338 (1939), cf. D. 
Osborn, “Suppressing the truth: judicial exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in the United States, 
Canada, England and Australia”, in Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, Vol. 7, No. 4, 
December 2000. 
2 For a perspective from beyond European borders see the case of Maher Arar and the entanglement of 
Canadian authorities, Commission of Inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in relation to Maher 
Arar, Report of the events relating to Maher Arar – analysis and recommendations, 2006, retrieved 
30.3.2007 from www.ararcommission.ca; see also Government of Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, 
Prime Minster releases letter of apology to Maher Arar and his family and announces completion of 
meditation process, 26.1.2007, retrieved 30.3.2007 from http://news.gc.ca. 
3 European Parliament, Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI)), P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032, 14.2.2007; 
see also the ‘Dick Marty report’ for the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal 2 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
as well as the EP Temporary Committee’s recent working document No. 9,
4 give ample 
illustrations of such practice and offer a good opportunity to address some of the issues 
concerned. 
This paper therefore deals with the subject of how EU member states could not resist the 
temptation of taking advantage of extraordinary renditions and unlawful detentions and how 
they still profit from such practice. Recent examples of this kind of ‘profiteering’ are provided, 
together with an assessment of their legality. The second part of the paper addresses the issue 
from an EU perspective and evaluates various related implications of and for EU counter-
terrorism policies, in particular the question of these policies being tainted by the questionable 
counter-terrorism behaviour of member states, and what possible solutions exist to prevent or at 
least lessen such entanglement. To this end a concrete set of policy recommendations is 
proposed in the last chapter. 
In the context of this paper ‘rendition’ shall be understood as a situation in which one state 
obtains custody over a person suspected of involvement in a serious crime in the territory of 
another state, with the aim of transferring such a person to custody in the first state’s territory 
(or a place subject to its jurisdiction) or to a third state. A rendition shall be considered 
‘extraordinary’ when it is not executed in accordance with the law applying in the state where 
the person was situated at the time of seizure.
5 ‘Unlawful detention’ shall be understood as a 
deprivation of personal liberty characterised by a violation of indispensable defense rights, e.g. 
access to judicial review and professional legal advice
6; in short: a detention, which places the 
detained person de facto outside the protection of law.
7 
1.  Taking advantage of extraordinary rendition and unlawful detention 
At least two variations of how European ‘security professionals’
8 profited or tried to profit from 
extraordinary renditions and unlawful detentions have come to light in recent months. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged secret detentions in Council of Europe member states, Information 
Memorandum II, AS/Jur (2006) 03 rev, 22.1.2006. An ongoing observation is provided by Statewatch, cf.  
http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html.  
4 EP Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transport and 
illegal detention of prisoners, Working document No. 9, 26.2.2007.   
5 Cf. also E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), Opinion no 3-2006: 
The human rights responsibilities of the EU member states in the context of the C.I.A. activities in Europe 
(‘extraordinary renditions’), 25.5.2006, p. 6. 
6 Cf. European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion no 363/2005 on 
the international legal obligations of Council of Europe member states in respect of secret detention 
facilities and inter-state transport of prisoners, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 66
th plenary 
session (Venice, 17-18 March 2006), CDL-AD(2006)009, 17.3.2006, para. 121 pp. 
7 Cf. Art. 2 International Convention for the protection of all persons from enforced disappearances as 
adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 December 2006. 
8 See for this term: D. Bigo, “Globalized (in)security: the Field and the Ban-opticon”, in D. Bigo & A. 
Tsoukala (eds), Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: the (In)Security Games, L’Harmattan: Paris, 2006, 
pp. 5-49. FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE | 3 
 
1.1  Variation No. 1 – Interrogations at Guantánamo Bay and other 
detention centres 
The EP resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation 
and illegal detention of prisoners states that at least two member states and one candidate 
country have sent security professionals to Guantánamo Bay and detention centres in Pakistan 
and Syria. The duty of these officials has not been to provide assistance to their detained 
citizens or long-term residents, but to interrogate and gain information from them. The countries 
named in the EP resolution are the UK,
9 Germany
10 and Turkey.
11 Media coverage suggests that 
other countries might have done the same, e.g. France. According to these sources French 
intelligence agents questioned six French citizens inside the Guantánamo camp in 2002.
12 In 
addition, certain countries have adopted the practice of not sending their own officials for the 
interrogations on these sites, but instead they supply questions to foreign interrogators, making 
it practically impossible to control the methods of interrogation.
13  
In Germany, at least
14 the federal government has not denied having sent its officials abroad, a 
practice that came under scrutiny early in 2006 by the Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium. This 
parliamentary control panel of the German Bundestag has the statutory mandate to observe and 
hold accountable the activities of the German intelligence service. In its report for the panel, the 
German government conceded that officials had been interrogating detainees abroad and upheld 
that such activities are an indispensable part of intelligence information gathering. The 
government stressed that the information obtained is destined only to serve intelligence 
purposes and not as evidence in criminal court proceedings. The German government 
guaranteed that ‘in future’, officials of criminal investigation services will no longer be part of 
interrogation teams (a guarantee demonstrating that in the past, the distinction between 
intelligence and criminal investigations was not observed). The government report further notes 
that interrogations abroad only took place – and will continue to do so – with the free consent of 
the person interrogated. In addition, no interrogation will commence or continue – according to 
the government – when there are signs that the person has been subjected to torture.
15 With the 
                                                      
9 European Parliament, Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI)), P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032, 14.2.2007, 
para. 76, 77. 
10 European Parliament, Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI)), P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032, 14.2.2007, 
para. 87, 93. 
11 European Parliament, Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI)), P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032, 14.2.2007, 
para. 135. 
12 Cf. “French agents questioned detainees in Guantanamo”, The Independent, 6.7.2006, retrieved 
27.3.2007 from www.independent.co.uk.  
13 Cf. House of Lords/House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, The UN Convention 
against Torture (UNCAT), Nineteenth report of session 2005-06, Volume I – Report and formal minutes, 
18 May 2006, p. 22, relying on a court statement by the Director General of the Security Services, Dame 
Eliza Manningham-Buller. 
14 For the UK see also House of Lords/House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, The UN 
Convention against Torture (UNCAT), Nineteenth report of session 2005-06, Volume I – Report and 
formal minutes, 18 May 2006, para. 57. 
15 Bericht der Bundesregierung (Offene Fassung) gemäß Anforderung des Parlamentarischen 
Kontrollgremiums vom 25. Januar 2006 zu Vorgängen im Zusammenhang mit dem Irakkrieg und der 
Bekämpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus, Berlin, 23.2.2006, pp. 82-87, retrieved 24.11.2006 from 
http://www.bundestag.de.  4 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
majority of its members in the parliamentary control panel, the government coalition of 
Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD) largely accepted the government’s 
statements, cleared its activities and acknowledged the promises to draw a clearer line between 
intelligence and criminal investigation in the future.
16 However, this rather lenient outcome has 
met with well-pronounced dissent from the members of the opposition in the panel.
17  
1.2  Variation No. 2 – Information exchange with foreign services and the 
use of such information 
The second variation of profiting from extraordinary renditions and unlawful detention is 
somewhat more sophisticated: officials themselves don’t have to travel around and be 
confronted with the difficult question of whether a detainee has ‘voluntarily’ given consent to 
the interrogation; but it is the ‘neutral’ information itself that makes its way from detention 
centres abroad to databases and files in Europe. The information is offered by foreign services 
and the question of whether these services have used torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment in order to obtain the valuable information remains unclear. This is illustrated in the 
German government’s report to the parliamentary control panel, mentioned above: 
Interrogation output – also from the American side – has been occasionally offered in the 
past to the German government, insofar as foreign authorities considered it relevant for 
German authorities. This interrogation output contains statements that the interrogated 
persons have made in relation to specific issues. However, it does not contain any 
information on the whereabouts of the detainees nor of their rendition to other countries. 
The interrogation protocols neither contain information on the circumstances of the 
interrogation nor the personal condition of the detainees.
18 
Concerning the use of information obtained in this way, a telling example is provided by recent 
proceedings in the UK. Unlike the German government, which according to its February 2006 
report does not intend to use such information in court proceedings, the UK government 
strongly propagated the view that information obtained through torture abroad (in the following: 
‘foreign torture information’) must be admissible as evidence in court as long as there is no 
direct participation of British officials during the torture itself.
19 It may come as a surprise that 
not only the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) – nothing less than a superior 
court – but also the Court of Appeal for England and Wales
20 approved this ‘innovative’ 
interpretation. It eventually required the Law Lords of the House of Lords to remind the 
                                                      
16 Deutscher Bundestag, Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremium,  Bewertung des Parlamentarischen 
Kontrollgremiums (PKGr) zum Bericht der Bundesregierung zu den Vorgängen im Zusammenhang mit 
dem Irak-Krieg und der Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus, 22.2.2006, pp. 35-39, retrieved 
24.11.2006 from http://www.bundestag.de.  
17 Cf. Abweichende Bewertung des Abg. Dr. Max Stadler (FDP), 22. Februar 2006, retrieved 24.11.2006 
from under http://www.bundestag.de ; Abweichende Bewertung des Abg. Wolfgang Neskovic (Die 
Linke), no date, retrieved 24.11.2006 from  http://www.bundestag.de, Abweichende Bewertung des 
Mitglieds des Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums Hans-Christian Ströbele (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), 
23.2.2006, retrieved 24.11.2006 from http://www.bundestag.de.  
18 Bericht der Bundesregierung (Offene Fassung) gemäß Anforderung des Parlamentarischen 
Kontrollgremiums vom 25. Januar 2006 zu Vorgängen im Zusammenhang mit dem Irakkrieg und der 
Bekämpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus, Berlin, 23.2.2006, p. 80 (translation by the author). 
19 See European Parliament, Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006/2200(INI)), P6_TA-PROV(2007)0032, 14.2.2007, 
para. 79. 
20 England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 1123. judgment of 11.8.2004. FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE | 5 
 
executive and the lower courts of the common law tradition, as well as European and 
international law obligations, prohibiting the use of torture. The House of Lords rejected this 
‘new’ understanding in no uncertain terms. To cite Lord Bingham of Cornhill: 
But the English common law has regarded torture and its fruits with abhorrence for over 
500 years, and that abhorrence is now shared by over 140 countries which have acceded to 
the Torture Convention. I am startled, even a little dismayed, at the suggestion (and the 
acceptance by the Court of Appeal majority) that this deeply-rooted tradition and an 
international obligation solemnly and explicitly undertaken can be overridden by a statute 
and a procedural rule which make no mention of torture at all.
21 
As clear as this position seems to be, there still remain unresolved questions. One of them is of a 
more procedural – but no less important – nature and concerns the burden of proof: who should 
prove that evidence presented by the prosecutors is in fact a fruit of torture? The accused or the 
prosecutor? The majority in the House of Lords has shifted this burden ultimately to the 
accused, however not without having to face heavy criticism from some of their peers. Again, 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill: 
(…) it is inconsistent with the rudimentary notions of fairness to blindfold a man and then 
impose a standard which only the sighted could hope to meet.
22 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s criticism is justified, as the majority of the Law Lords has in fact 
imposed too high a standard on the burden of proof. As a consequence, the Law Lord’s test has 
provoked the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, to submit an interim 
report to the UN General Assembly analysing the Law Lords’ decision. In this report he recalls 
that according to the individual complaints procedures before the UN Committee against 
torture, it is established that the applicant is only required to demonstrate that his or her 
allegations of torture are well-founded. The ultimate burden of proof thereafter shifts to the 
state.
23 
The second question in the House of Lords’ judgment that remains open – as the Lords did not 
have to rule on it – is whether there is a difference between foreign torture information used in 
courts and such information used by executive bodies. While the Lords ruled out the first, their 
obiter dicta suggest that they accept the latter. We will come to this later in more detail. 
1.3 Contradictory  combinations of these two variations 
The account of these two variations of profiteering from extraordinary renditions and unlawful 
detention shall serve as an interim conclusion before advancing to the legal assessment and EU 
implications. At this stage it is important to note that in practice neither variation will stand 
separately from each other but will be mostly complementary or even overlap. Such 
complementarity, however, might have adverse effects: responsible behaviour of security 
officials in questionable situations might get frustrated by the fact that the information these 
officials were originally supposed to obtain, but refused to do so, nevertheless finds its way to 
the interested clientele in the long run. The following serves as an example: 
                                                      
21 House of Lords, Opinion of the Lords of Appeal for judgment in the cause A (FC) and others (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71, 8.12.2005, para. 51. 
22 House of Lords, Opinion of the Lords of Appeal for judgment in the cause A (FC) and others (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71, 8.12.2005, para. 59. 
23 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, United Nations General Assembly Doc. A/61/259, 14.8.2006, p. 17.  6 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
In November 2006, German media reported the case of 74-year old Abdel-Halim Khafagy, a 
long-term German resident of Egyptian nationality.
24 He was reported to have been captured in 
2001 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, maltreated and brought to a US military base in Tuzla, named 
‘Eagle base’. Two officials from the Bundeskriminalamt, the German federal criminal police 
office and one interpreter from the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the German secret service, were 
apparently sent to interrogate Khafagy. Since they formed the impression that detainees in Eagle 
base were subject to inhuman, torture-like treatment, they refused to interrogate, travelled back 
to Germany and reported the situation to their offices. Cited by Süddeutsche Zeitung, one of the 
officials said: “Serbs found themselves before the UN criminal tribunal in The Hague for what 
the Americans did in Tuzla”.
25 After three weeks Khafagy was supposedly brought to Egypt and 
then back to Germany. He later applied for German citizenship. During the administrative 
naturalisation proceedings pursued by the local Munich administration, Khafagy – in 2004 – 
was suddenly confronted with information he was said to have given at Eagle Base in 2001, 
insinuating links with a terrorism suspect. In essence this means that although German officials 
declined to take advantage of the situation in 2001, information obtained in Eagle Base 
nevertheless made its way to Germany, was saved and stored, ready to be provided to local 
administrations and used in a case of naturalisation. If proven correct, these findings suggest 
that inter-service exchange of information might well override efforts of single officials to 
comply with legal and moral standards in counter-terrorism activities. 
2. Legal  assessment 
In general there is no dissent on the legal principles regarding the use of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment. However, the consequences which are then derived from these principles is 
a huge field open to dispute.  
2.1 The  foundations 
To put it bluntly: torture is outlawed and criminalised. “The torturer has become, like the pirate 
and the slave trader before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”
26 The 
prohibition of the use of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment is enshrined in many 
human rights treaties of international law
27, the most prominent being the UN Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 
December 1984 (CAT).
28 In many national criminal laws, torture is explicitly formulated as an 
offence, in accordance with Article 4 CAT.
29 The Convention also goes beyond the traditional 
                                                      
24 „Behörden nutzten Informationen von Misshandelten“, tagesschau.de, 24.11.2006, retrieved 
24.11.2006 from www.tagesschau.de; „Unbequeme Fragen im Untersuchungsausschuss“, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 25./26.11.2006, p. 7. 
25 „In der Rolle eines lästigen Bittstellers“, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1.3.2007, p. 6 (translation by the 
author). 
26 US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 30.6.1980, Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876. 
27 Cf. Article 7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Article 5 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (non-binding, but persuasive authority); Article 3 Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); Article 4 Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (non binding, but persuasive authority). 
28  UN Treaty Series, Vol. 1465, p. 85. The Convention entered into force on 26.6.1987 and has currently 
(March 2007) 144 parties. 
29 See for a detailed survey on EU member states compliance with article 4 CAT: E.U. Network of 
Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), Opinion no 3-2006: The human rights FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE | 7 
 
understanding of territorial and national jurisdiction and establishes – with the aim of avoiding 
safe havens for torturers – the principle of universal jurisdiction: all states are entitled and 
obliged to investigate and prosecute torture allegations, no matter if they have been committed 
on their territory or by one of their citizens or residents.
30 Article 14 of the UN Convention 
provides an enforceable right for the victims of torture to fair and adequate compensation.
31 
In addition, “because of the importance of the values it protects this principle has evolved into a 
peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international 
hierarchy than treaty law and even ‘ordinary’ customary rules.”
32 This means that states cannot 
derogate from the prohibition of torture through international treaties or local custom.
33 In 
addition, the classification as jus cogens imposes direct obligations on individuals that transcend 
national obligations imposed by individual states. Even if a state would authorise the use of 
torture, each individual official – although legitimised by his state – would nevertheless be 
bound to comply with the principle. This personal criminal liability is furthermore enhanced by 
the entitlement of every other state to prosecute and punish any torturer present in its 
jurisdiction, as stated above.
34 
Concerning the scope of obligations put on states by this principle, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has ruled:  
States are obliged not only to prohibit and punish torture, but also to forestall its 
occurrence: it is insufficient merely to intervene after the infliction of torture, when the 
physical or moral integrity of human beings has already been irremediably harmed. 
Consequently, States are bound to put in place all those measures that may pre-empt the 
perpetration of torture. As was authoritatively held by the European Court of Human Rights 
in  Soering, international law intends to bar not only actual breaches but also potential 
breaches of the prohibition against torture (as well as any inhuman and degrading 
treatment). It follows that international rules prohibit not only torture but also (i) the failure 
to adopt the national measures necessary for implementing the prohibition and (ii) the 
maintenance in force or passage of laws which are contrary to the prohibition.
35 
Due attention must furthermore be paid to the following legal bedrocks: 
a)  Article 1 of the UN Torture Convention asks for more than just abstention from the use of 
torture but also explicitly outlaws consent and acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. 
                                                                                                                                                            
responsibilities of the EU member states in the context of the C.I.A. activities in Europe (‘extraordinary 
renditions’), 25.5.2006, pp. 18-20. 
30 On the reluctance of making use of this principle see, United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, Report, United Nations 
General Assembly Doc. A/HRC/4/33, 15.1.2007, pp. 11-15. 
31 United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, Manfred Nowak, Report, United Nations General Assembly Doc. A/HRC/4/33, 15.1.2007, 
pp. 20-21; see also “Torturers ‘must pay victims’ – UN”, BBC News, 27.3.2007, retrieved 28.3.2007 from 
www.bbc.co.uk.  
32 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija [1998] ICTY 
3, 10 December 1998, para. 153. 
33 Cf. also Council of Europe, Guidelines on human rights and the fight against terrorism, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 11 July 2002 at the 804
th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, p. 12. 
34 Cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija [1998] 
ICTY 3, 10.12.1998, para. 155, 156. 
35 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija [1998] ICTY 
3, 10.12.1998, para. 148. 8 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
b)  Article 3 ECHR, prohibiting torture or any other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society and 
requires states inter alia to take positive action to prevent individuals within their 
jurisdiction from falling subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, according to 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
36 
c)  Finally, and most importantly: states cannot abandon their human rights obligations simply 
by acting outside their territorial jurisdiction.
37 
With regard to the legal assessment of ‘extraordinary renditions’, the EU Network of 
Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights stated the following in its opinion no. 3-2006 of 25 
May 2006: 
‘Extraordinary renditions’ infringe on various national and international laws, like the 
Convention on International and Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944 (Chicago Convention) 
and other bilateral aviation agreements, the principle of sovereignty and domestic laws 
regulating the legality of activities of foreign agents on the host State’s territory, and, most 
importantly, a number of human rights provisions, including the right to personal liberty, 
freedom of movement and the prohibition of arbitrary expulsion, the right to a fair trial and, 
finally, the right not to be subjected to torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or to be brought to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that the personal risk to be tortured is high (principle of nonrefoulement).
38 
As a consequence of the fact that the actions labelled ‘extraordinary renditions’ also amount to 
criminal offences, like deprivation of liberty and battery, public prosecutors and judges in 
several member states, e.g. Italy and Germany, have issued arrest warrants against individuals 
being suspected of having committed these offences.
39 
2.2  The participation of agents in interrogations abroad 
What follows from this for the assessment of the first variation of member states’ profiteering? 
The interrogation of an individual kept in unlawful detention or having been subject to 
extraordinary rendition by agents of European intelligence or law enforcement services appears 
not only to be highly hypocritical from a political point of view, given the fact that in June 2006 
EU leaders urged President Bush to close the Guantánamo camp,
40 but – in view of the legal 
                                                      
36 ECtHR, Z. and others v. U.K., application no. 29392/05, 10.5.2001, para. 69-75. 
37 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Advisory opinion on legal consequences of the construction of a 
wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, 9.7.2004, para. 109; ECtHR, Öcalan v. Turkey, application no. 
46221/99, 12.5.2005, para. 91; ECtHR, Issa and others v. Turkey, application no. 31821/96, 16.11.2004, 
para. 66-71; ECtHR, Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, application no. 48787/99, 8.7.2004, para. 
310-319; see also E. Guild, Security and European Human Rights: protecting individual rights in times of 
exception and military action, Wolf Legal Publishers: Nijmegen, 2007, pp. 17-21. 
38 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), Opinion no 3-2006: The 
human rights responsibilities of the EU member states in the context of the C.I.A. activities in Europe 
(‘extraordinary renditions’), 25.5.2006, p. 25; Cf. also Committee on International Human Rights of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
New York University School of Law, Torture by Proxy: international and domestic law applicable to 
‘extraordinary renditions’, 2004, modified June 2006. 
39 Cf. Pressemitteilung der Staatsanwaltschaft München I in Sachen El Masri, 31.1.2007, retrieved 
22.3.2007 from http://www4.justiz.bayern.de; „The CIA in the dock”, Spiegel online, 10.1.2007 retrieved 
22.3.2007 from http://www.spiegel.de.  
40 „EU to press for Guantánamo closure“, Financial Times, 12.6.2006, retrieved 12.3.2007 from 
www.ft.com; “Guantanamo clouds EU-US meeting”, BBC News, 21.6.2006, retrieved 12.3.2007 from FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE | 9 
 
foundations outlined above – would also appear to be legally borderline, and most probably 
beyond what is legal. 
A joint report by five UN Special Rapporteurs was submitted to the UN Human Rights 
Commission on the ‘Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay’ in February 2006. The report 
highlights severe violations of human rights obligations by the US administration, inter alia 
article 9 ICCPR
41 (prohibition of arbitrary detention) and article 14 (right to fair trial). The 
interrogation methods applied were said to amount to degrading treatment in violation of article 
7 ICCPR and article 16 CAT.
42 The general conditions, and in particular the uncertainty about 
the length of detention and prolonged isolation confinement, were considered to represent 
inhuman treatment and to be in violation of the obligation to treat detainees with humanity and 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, article 10 ICCPR.
43 An analysis applying 
the obligations deriving from the ECHR
44 would reach different conclusions, as highlighted by 
the Venice Commission’s opinion on the international legal obligations of Council of Europe 
member states in respect of secret detention facilities and inter-state transport of prisoners. This 
opinion also supports the argument that prolonged unlawful detention as such – independent of 
the question of torture being applied – may constitute inhuman or degrading treatment 
prohibited by article 3 ECHR – not to mention the violation of the right to a fair trial as 
enshrined in article 6 ECHR.
 45 
Based on these findings, the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights 
concluded that EU member states are under an obligation to prohibit the removal of persons 
under their jurisdiction to Guantánamo Bay or any other location where such persons risk being 
subject to torture or to forms of treatment which are considered cruel, inhuman or degrading 
under international law, and that member states are furthermore obliged to start criminal 
proceedings and investigate substantiated allegations of torture and unlawful detentions.
46 The 
findings of the Venice Commission in relation to Council of Europe member states have been 
no different in this regard. 
In conclusion, member states’ practice of taking advantage of extraordinary renditions and 
unlawful detention by sending their agents to these sites hardly seems legal or justifiable. If 
                                                                                                                                                            
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk. Cf. also: “The right to a fair trial is another basic human right. With respect to 
secret or incommunicado detention centres, the EU’s position is clear. As Javier Solana has said, any such 
centres, in Europe or elsewhere, would violate international human rights and humanitarian law”, G. de 
Vries, The fight against terrorism – five years after 9/11, Presentation by Gijs de Vries, EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator, Annual European Foreign Policy Conference, London School of Economics & 
King’s College London, 30.6.2006, p. 8 retrieved 24.3.2007 from http://consilium.europa.eu.  
41 See footnote 27. 
42 For a documentation on the so called ‘torture memos’ of the US administration, see K.J. Greenberg & 
J.L. Dratel, The Torture Papers – the Road to Abu Ghraib, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
2005. 
43 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Situation of detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120, 15.2.2006, pp. 36-40. 
44 See footnote 27. 
45 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion no 363/2005 on 
the international legal obligations of Council of Europe member states in respect of secret detention 
facilities and inter-state transport of prisoners, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 66
th plenary 
session (Venice, 17-18 March 2006), CDL-AD(2006)009, 17.3.2006, para. 121. 
46 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (CFR-CDF), Opinion no 3-2006: The 
human rights responsibilities of the EU member states in the context of the C.I.A. activities in Europe 
(‘extraordinary renditions’), 25 May 2006, p. 28. 10 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
member states are under an obligation to protect their citizens and residents from such treatment 
and to start criminal investigations against the abductors, the only acceptable reasons for their 
officials to visit sites where individuals are unlawfully detained or subject to inhuman treatment 
must be to provide assistance to the detainees or to gather evidence against the persons 
responsible for the rendition or detention. 
The categorical misunderstanding that seems to cloud official discourse so far, however, is 
illustrated by the German government’s report of 23 February 2006.
47 While the government 
seeks to emphasise the legality of interrogations abroad by establishing that these will only take 
place with the free consent of the person interrogated and that no interrogation will commence 
or continue when there are signs that the person has been subject to torture, it – intentionally or 
not – ignores the fact that entanglement and complicity is still there, even if the person has not 
been subject to torture. Indeed the ‘simple’ fact of illegal rendition and detention is already a 
violation of human rights and a breach of law severe enough to prohibit member states from 
taking any advantage of it. 
There is another dimension to this issue that may have been neglected so far: member states not 
only carry responsibility for their detained citizens or residents, but also for their agents. As laid 
down under article 2.1, one of the consequences of the jus cogens nature of torture prohibition is 
that every person who finds himself in breach of this principle will be held individually 
responsible and will not be allowed to justify himself by referring to higher orders or state 
legitimatisation. Member state governments should therefore be aware of the duty of care for 
their officials and not expose them to the risk of criminal charges by sending them to 
questionable sites. 
2.3  The use of information obtained through torture 
The second question that needs to be addressed relates to the use of ‘foreign torture information’ 
obtained by intelligence services or law enforcement agencies. As already outlined above 1.2, 
the official discourse discerns two possible usages of such information: a) the use of foreign 
torture information as evidence in courts and b) the use of foreign torture information for 
executive purposes, e.g. intelligence activities, prevention of imminent dangers, etc. 
In relation to the ECHR, the Court in Strasbourg has ruled that the use of evidence in criminal 
proceedings obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the 
accused has to be assessed by the right not to incriminate oneself; a right that is considered part 
of the fair trial provision of article 6 ECHR.
48 
With regard to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment its article 15 stipulates:  
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as 
a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a 
person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made. 
As has been intensively demonstrated in the House of Lords judgment of December 2005,
49 the 
underlying rationale of this provision is not only that evidence under torture is most often 
                                                      
47 See above 1.1. 
48 ECtHR, Saunders v. UK, application no. 43/1994/490/572, 17 December 1996, para. 68, 69; ECtHR, 
Funke v. France, application no. 10828/84, 25 February 1993, para. 44. 
49 See above 1.2; cf. also T. Thienel, “The admissibility of evidence obtained by torture under 
international law”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 17 no. 2, 2006, pp. 349-367; N. Rasiah, FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE | 11 
 
proven to be unreliable and that investigators should be discouraged from applying torture.
50 In 
addition, the admissibility of evidence obtained through torture would shock the judicial 
conscience, degrade the proceedings and involve the state in moral defilement.
51 
Consequently, the House of Lords unanimously rejected the government’s notion that only 
‘homemade’ torture evidence would be barred from serving as evidence in courts. This 
judgment should be considered as a leading case and serve as persuasive authority for similar 
proceedings in other member states’ courts. However, as mentioned earlier, the Lords did not 
have to rule on the question of foreign torture information being admissible for usages outside 
the court room. They nevertheless addressed the issue and took a rather different approach. Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead’s opinion serves as an illustration of this: 
67. Torture attracts universal condemnation, as amply demonstrated by my noble and 
learned friend Lord Bingham of Cornhill. No civilised society condones its use. Unhappily, 
condemnatory words are not always matched by conduct. Information derived from sources 
where torture is still practised gives rise to the present problem. The context is cross-border 
terrorism. Countering international terrorism calls for a flow of information between the 
security services of many countries. Fragments of information, acquired from various 
sources, can be pieced together to form a valuable picture, enabling governments of 
threatened countries to take preventative steps. What should the security services and the 
police and other executive agencies of this country do if they know or suspect information 
received by them from overseas is the product of torture? Should they discard this 
information as 'tainted', and decline to use it lest its use by them be regarded as condoning 
the horrific means by which the information was obtained? 
68. The intuitive response to these questions is that if use of such information might save 
lives it would be absurd to reject it. If the police were to learn of the whereabouts of a 
ticking bomb it would be ludicrous for them to disregard this information if it had been 
procured by torture. No one suggests the police should act in this way. Similarly, if tainted 
information points a finger of suspicion at a particular individual: depending on the 
circumstances, this information is a matter the police may properly take into account when 
considering, for example, whether to make an arrest. 
69. In both these instances the executive arm of the state is open to the charge that it is 
condoning the use of torture. So, in a sense, it is. The government is using information 
obtained by torture. But in cases such as these the government cannot be expected to close 
its eyes to this information at the price of endangering the lives of its own citizens. Moral 
repugnance to torture does not require this.
52 
Lord Nicholls’ statement that it would be ‘absurd’ and ‘ludicrous’ to reject torture information 
that might help prevent imminent danger to the lives of citizens is representative of this 
discussion so far. In a similar notion, the German government stated that the principles of rule 
of law do not prevent the government from accepting interrogation-output from foreign 
                                                                                                                                                            
“A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2): Occupying the moral high ground?”, Modern 
Law Review, Vol. 69, No. 6, 2006, pp. 995-1005. 
50 Cf. J.H. Burgers & H. Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: Handbook on the 
Convention against Torture, Dordrecht et al: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988, p. 148; see also T. Bruha 
& C. J. Tams, “Folter und Völkerrecht”, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 36, September 2006, pp. 16-
22; Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, United Nations General Assembly Doc. A/61/259, 14.8.2006, p. 10. 
51 House of Lords, Opinion of the Lords of Appeal for judgment in the cause A (FC) and others (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71, 8.12.2005, para. 39. 
52 House of Lords, Opinion of the Lords of Appeal for judgment in the cause A (FC) and others (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71, 8.12.2005, para. 67-69. 12 | FLORIAN GEYER 
 
services. Although it concedes that there is no guarantee that this information might have been 
gained by unlawful means, the government upheld that in order to protect public security it is 
obliged to pursue any hints that might help to prevent imminent acts of violence.
53 In an 
interview with a German newspaper, the federal minister of interior, Wolfgang Schäuble was 
cited with the words: “If we were to say that under no circumstances would we use information 
where we cannot be certain it was obtained under completely constitutional conditions that 
would be totally irresponsible. We must use such information.”
54 Similarly, in 2004 the UK 
Home Secretary David Blunkett commented on the favourable decision of the Court of 
Appeal.
55 
The fact that even those Law Lords who so vigorously rejected the government’s attempt to 
rewrite the history of torture prohibition have been willing to accept that in certain 
circumstances foreign torture information may be used by executive agencies, cannot be easily 
dismissed.
56 On the other hand there can be no doubt that such use of torture information 
undermines the absolute prohibition of torture and also runs counter to one of the underlying 
reasons of article 15 CAT: the discouragement of security professionals to resort to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment. In addition, there remains a question mark over why the other 
reasons underlying the exclusion of torture evidence in court proceedings shall not pertain to 
executive decisions. Is there no ‘degrading of proceedings’? No ‘state involvement in moral 
defilement’? The Australian scholar Ben Saul has put it like this: “Further, there is a certain 
moral hypocrisy about the House of Lords judgment which finds that torture evidence can never 
be allowed to contaminate the purity of judicial process, while holding that governments have a 
duty to get their hands dirty precisely this way.”
57 
This dilemma has also been addressed in a recent inquiry into the UN Convention against 
torture, conducted by the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human 
Rights. The approach taken by the members of the Committee acknowledges the underlying 
difficulties but refuses to give a ‘carte blanche’ to the executive; this seems a good basis for 
further discussions and shall therefore be cited in more detail: 
55. We accept that UNCAT and other provisions of human rights law do not prohibit the 
use of information from foreign intelligence sources, which may have been obtained under 
torture, to avert imminent loss of life by searches, arrests or other similar measures. We 
cannot accept the absolutist position on this subject advanced by some NGOs when human 
                                                      
53 Bericht der Bundesregierung (Offene Fassung) gemäß Anforderung des Parlamentarischen 
Kontrollgremiums vom 25. Januar 2006 zu Vorgängen im Zusammenhang mit dem Irakkrieg und der 
Bekämpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus, Berlin, 23.2.2006, pp. 80, retrieved 24.11.2006 from 
http://www.bundestag.de.  
54 Cited after EP Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transport and illegal detention of prisoners, Working document No. 9, 26.2.2007, p. 16 (translation by the 
author). 
55 Cf. Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Ambivalence: UK Policy on Torture since 9/11, November 2006, 
p.14; on the U.K.’s counter-terrorism policy in general see also R. Parkes & A. Maurer, Britische Anti-
Terror-Politik und die Internationalisierung der inneren Sicherheit- Zur Balance zwischen Freiheit, 
Sicherheit und Demokratie, SWP Studie S 3, Berlin, January 2007. 
56 On the difficulties of the debate in general see e.g. M. Ignatieff, “If torture works…”, Prospect, issue 
121, April 2006, retrieved 24.3.2007 from http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/ 
vis_index.php?select_issue=519.   
57 B. Saul, “The Torture Debate: International Law and the Age of Terrorism”, Australian Red Cross: 
NSW International Humanitarian Law Program Lecture Series, NSW Law Week, 28.3.2006, p. 10, 
retrieved 12.3.2007 from http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/publications/docs/pubs/ 
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life, possibly many hundreds of lives, may be at stake. (…) However great care must be 
taken to ensure that use of such information is only made in cases of imminent threat to life. 
Care must also be taken to ensure that the use of information in this way, and in particular 
any repeated or regular use of such information, especially from the same source or 
sources, does not render the UK authorities complicit in torture by lending tacit support or 
agreement to the use of torture or inhuman treatment as a means of obtaining information 
which might be useful to the UK in preventing terrorist attacks. Ways need to be found to 
reduce and, we would hope, eliminate dependence on such information. (…). 
56. In our view, the fundamental importance of the obligations on the UK concerning 
torture makes it incumbent on the intelligence services to move beyond the essentially 
passive stance towards the methods and techniques of foreign intelligence agencies (…). In 
Canada, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service ("CSIS") is under a statutory 
obligation to notify the Government of any arrangements for sharing information with any 
foreign intelligence agencies. Those liaison arrangements are also subjected to independent 
scrutiny by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Review Committee, a statutory body 
external to the intelligence agencies and at arms length from the Government. We do not 
necessarily suggest this as a model, but we do draw attention to the greater degree of 
formality in the making of arrangements between domestic and foreign intelligence services 
and to the fact that such arrangements are subjected to independent scrutiny. In our view, 
the need to use information which has or may have been obtained by torture could be 
significantly reduced if the UK intelligence services took a more proactive approach 
when establishing the framework arrangements for intelligence sharing with other 
intelligence agencies, by making clear the minimum standards which it expects to be 
observed and monitoring for compliance with those standards, and if there were some 
opportunity for independent scrutiny of those arrangements.
58 (emphasis in the 
original). 
Several aspects of this statement are important:  
1)  As a rule, the use of foreign torture information is inadmissible. Only in exceptional 
circumstances, i.e. to avert imminent threats to life, might it be acceptable.  
2)  Security services must under all circumstances avoid making themselves complicit in 
torture, let alone get directly involved. They are barred from granting tacit support or 
agreement to the use of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. 
3)  Security services are not allowed to be passive consumers of foreign torture information but 
are under an obligation to reduce the need to use such information and must establish 
minimum standards for the exchange of information with foreign services. 
4)  A certain degree of formality in the making of liaison arrangements with foreign services 
and the independent scrutiny of these arrangements are deemed crucial. 
3.  Implications of and for EU counter-terrorism policies and actions 
What is the European Union’s part in all this? So far it appears as if the EU has found itself – 
justifiably or not – quite well-positioned in the affair that has evolved around CIA flights, 
detention centres on European territory and the complicity of European security agencies. 
Public outrage and the sincere concern of civil society and media has so far focused mainly on 
the member states and essentially spared the EU level. The recent resolution on CIA activities in 
                                                      
58 House of Lords/House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, The UN Convention against 
Torture (UNCAT), Nineteenth report of session 2005-06, Volume I – Report and formal minutes, 18 May 
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Europe by one of its ever more important institutions, the European Parliament, has hugely 
contributed to this position and has largely helped to keep the EU out of the line of fire.
59 
In addition, EU counter-terrorism activities, including one of its early measures after 9/11: the 
framework decision on the European arrest warrant,
60 but also Europol,
61 Eurojust
62 and other 
mechanisms, networks and bodies established under the EU’s second and third pillar,
63 could 
even help to bring to trial the suspects allegedly involved in extraordinary renditions like the 
CIA agents currently sought by Italy and Germany. That EU counter-terrorism measures might 
serve as a useful tool in the investigation and prosecution of other counter-terrorism activities, 
only at first sight appears to be a contradiction undermining the ‘global war on terror’. At 
second sight, however, such measures are not only consequential but crucial, given that 
countering terrorism by illegal means, such as extraordinary renditions and secret detention 
(measures that undermine rule of law and respect for fundamental rights) eventually serve the 
terrorist’s cause, i.e. the destruction of the liberal and democratic state, the overturning of its 
basic legal principles and guiding moral values.
64 
In spite of these beneficial elements of EU action, policy-makers and institutional actors at EU 
level should be aware of the fact that the entanglement of member states’ intelligence services 
or law enforcement agencies might easily redound upon their efforts framed under the 
‘European Union counter-terrorism strategy’.
65 One of the inherent risks for the EU in illegal 
activities by member states exists on a practical level and is particularly imminent for the 
second variation of profiteering from unlawful renditions and detentions: the use of foreign 
torture information. 
There can be no question that the jus cogens obligations in relation to the prohibition of torture 
– including personal criminal responsibility – as outlined above 2.1 also bind institutional and 
individual actors at EU level. Furthermore, that the EU as such is not a signatory to any of the 
                                                      
59 Although the way political and national considerations of some MEPs threatened to water down the 
Temporary Committee’s effort at the last minute was a rather disillusioning and startling incident, in view 
of the gravity of the issues at stake, cf. D. Oosting, “Responsibility vanishes like CIA flights”, European 
Voice, 8-14 February 2007, p. 9. 
60 Council framework decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, pp. 1-18. 
61 Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the establishment of a European 
Police Office, OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, pp.2-32; See also Proposal for a Council decision establishing the 
European Police Office (Europol), presented by the Commission, COM(2006) 817 final of 20.12.2006. 
62 Council decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against 
serious crime (2002/187/JHA), OJ L 36 of 6.3.2002, pp.1-13. 
63 For overview and analysis see the dossier “Mapping the field of European Security” on the website of 
the CHALLENGE project, http://www.libertysecurity.org/mot96.html?var_recherche=mapping.  
64 On the requirements of an EU counter-terrorism strategy that is centered on the dimensions of freedom 
and justice, see T. Balzacq & S. Carrera, The EU’s fight against international terrorism – security 
problems, insecure solutions, CEPS Policy Brief No. 80, July 2005; cf. also T. Balzacq & S. Carrera, 
“The Development of JHA: Policy Recommendations”, in T. Balzacq & S. Carrera (eds), Security versus 
Freedom? – A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 291-295; D. Bigo, S. 
Carrera, E. Guild, R.B.J. Walker, The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: Mid-term 
Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE Project, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 4, February 2007, 
p. 15. 
65 Council of the European Union, The European Union counter-terrorism strategy: prevent, protect, 
pursue, respond – The European Union’s strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while 
respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, 
security and justice, Council doc. 14469/4/05, 30.11.2005. FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE | 15 
 
international human rights treaties does not exempt the Union from the requirement to respect 
fundamental rights based on the rule of law, as illustrated by article 6 Treaty on European Union 
(TEU).
66 Furthermore, the EU and its member states constantly repeat their commitment to the 
protection of human rights and the rule of law, most recently in the so called ‘Berlin 
Declaration’ of 25 March 2007.
67 
At the heart of the EU counter-terrorism strategy stands the strengthening of information 
exchange and the enhancement of cooperation among all relevant security services, including 
intelligence, law enforcement and judicial authorities.
68 The EU’s own security actors, namely 
(but not exclusively) Europol and its Counter-Terrorism Taskforce, Eurojust, the external border 
agency Frontex
69 as well as the EU Joint Situation Centre within the Council Secretariat 
(Sitcen)
70 rely on information provided by member states in order to perform their intelligence-
driven tasks.
71 In addition, the EU financial sanctions system directed against certain persons 
and entities with a view to combating terrorism,
72 commonly known as ‘terror lists’
73 also 
                                                      
66 Cf. only K. Lenaerts & P. van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2
nd edition, Sweet & 
Maxwell: London, 2005, para. 17-073 pp. 
67 “(…) for us, the individual is paramount. His dignity is inviolable. His rights are inalienable (…). We 
are striving for peace and freedom, for democracy and the rule of law, for mutual respect and shared 
responsibility, for prosperity and security, for tolerance and participation, for justice and solidarity”, 
Declaration on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, 
25.3.2007, retrieved 26.3.2007 from www.eu2007.de.  
68 Cf. Council of the European Union, The European Union counter-terrorism strategy: prevent, protect, 
pursue, respond – The European Union’s strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while 
respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, 
security and justice, Council doc. 14469/4/05, 30.11.2005, p. 12; EU Council Secretariat, Factsheet – The 
European Union and the fight against terrorism, 16.2.2007, p. 3. See also Council decision 
2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning 
terrorist offences, OJ L 253, 29.9.2005, pp. 22-24, recitals 2 and 3. 
69 For an assessment of Frontex activities see S. Carrera, The EU Border Management Strategy – Frontex 
and the challenges of irregular immigration in the Canary Islands, CEPS Working Document No. 261, 
March 2007; for an institutional overview see H. Jorry, Construction of a European model for managing 
operational cooperation at the EU’s external borders: is the Frontex agency a decisive step forward?, 
CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 6, March 2007. 
70 The ‘new’ Sitcen, operational since 2005, now comprises not only the external. 2
nd EU pillar 
intelligence dimensions but in addition also the internal 3
rd pillar intelligence dimensions. Sitcen is 
located within the Council Secretariat and composed of analysts from member states’ external and 
internal security services. Their task is to assess the terrorist threat as it develops both inside Europe and 
outside. Cf. Interview with G. de Vries, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Terrorism, Islam and 
democracy, 4.3.2005, retrieved 27.3.2007 from www.EurActiv.com; G. de Vries, “The European Union’s 
role in the fight against terrorism”, Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 16 (2005), pp. 3-9; cf. also 
Council Conclusions, Terrorism – Follow-up to the European Council Declaration, 8.6.2004, point 1, 
Council of the European Union, Press Release 2588
th Council meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, 
Luxembourg 8 June 2004, Council doc. 9782/04 (Presse 173), p. 9. See also Statewatch, EU: “Anti-
terrorism” legitimizes sweeping new “internal security” complex, Statewatch bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 5, 
August-October 2004, retrieved 27.3.2007 from www.statewatch.org.  
71 Cf. “Intelligence … not shared is useless and sometimes dangerous”, Max-Peter Ratzel, Director of 
Europol,  Working together to fight terrorism and crime, 12.9.2005, retrieved 24.3.2007 from 
www.epc.eu.   
72 Cf. Council common position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat 
terrorism, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, pp. 93-96; Council regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 
on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating 
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depend on member states’ information (or names provided by the UN Security Council
74); 
information that is then transformed into EU acts. But who guarantees that information thus 
processed is not the fruit of torture abroad? As far as can be seen there is no mechanism in force 
at EU level that would allow a control over the information provided and subsequently 
processed by member states to establish whether it is tainted by torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment. Moreover, it seems as if awareness of the problem is lacking in the first 
place.
75 
A recent landmark decision by the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Luxembourg dealing with the 
Council’s ‘terror lists’ illustrates this lack of control over the exchange and use of information: 
requested by the Court to give a coherent answer on the question of which national decision was 
the basis for the placing of an alleged terror group on the ‘terror list’, neither the Council nor the 
UK government involved were able to provide this answer and identify the underlying national 
measure.
76  
Attention must furthermore be given to the fact that the European Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice (AFSJ) aims at the free availability of relevant security information.
77 Until now, 
however, there has been no common framework in place that would regulate the conditions 
determining how such information enters the AFSJ. As a result, even if some member states and 
their services would strive to come closer to the spirit and intention of the UN Torture 
Convention and human right obligations by establishing clear agreements of cooperation and 
intelligence sharing with foreign services (centred on the refusal to collaborate in or take 
advantage of torture or other unlawful treatment),
78 these efforts would eventually be 
                                                                                                                                                            
restrictive measures against Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and 
other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with them (…), OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, pp. 
4-5; Council regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain restrictive measures directed 
against certain persons and entities associated with  Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the 
Taliban (…), OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, pp. 9-22.  
73 Cf. only “EU’s terror list is hard to escape”, European Voice, 8-14 March 2007, p. 7. 
74 See article 1(4) Council common position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures 
to combat terrorism, OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, pp. 93-96. 
75 Cf. Council of the European Union, Final Report on the evaluation of national Anti-terrorist 
arrangements: improving national machinery and capability for the fight against terrorism, Council doc. 
12168/05, 26.9.2005, recommendations 5 and 6, p. 9.  
76 CFI, T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedin du people d’Iran v. Council of the European Union, 
12.12.2006, para. 171. 
77 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom security and justice in 
the European Union, OJ C 53, 3.3.2005, pp. 1-14, point 2.1; See also Council decision 2005/671/JHA of 
20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, OJ L 
253, 29.9.2005, pp. 22-24; concerning the exchange of data held by law enforcement agencies see 
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council framework decision on the exchange 
of information under the principle of availability, COM(2005) 490 final, 12.10.2005; cf. also D. Bigo, W. 
Bruggeman, P. Burgess, V. Mitsilegas, The principle of information availability, 1.3.2007, retrieved 
24.3.2007 from http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1376.html; concerning European Justice and Home 
Affairs databases see Commission of the European Communities, Communication on improved 
effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among European databases in the area of justice 
and home affairs, COM(2005) 597 final, 24.11.2005; cf. also P. Hobbing, An Analysis of the Commission 
Communication (Com(2005) 597 Final of 24.11.2005) on Improved Effectiveness, Enhanced 
Interoperability and Synergies among European Databases in the Area of Justice And Home Affairs, 
31.1.2006, retrieved 24.3.2007 from http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1182.html.  
78 See the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights recommendations 
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undermined by the fact that other member states might cooperate less carefully with foreign 
services. Tainted information would therefore nevertheless make its way to the AFSJ and hence 
be shared and processed; this is a scenario that resembles the German Khafagy case as 
illustrated earlier (above 1.3). 
Finally, in the vast majority of cases, information processed at EU level does not serve to avoid 
‘imminent threats to life’ but rather for mid- and long-term objectives, like the freezing of 
financial means or – as in the case of Europol, Frontex and Sitcen – the creation of risk or crime 
analysis and strategic reports, e.g. threat assessments.
79 It is therefore necessary to raise the 
question of whether the argumentation brought forward at national level to justify the use of 
foreign torture information, i.e. state’s duty to prevent imminent threat to life,
80 is applicable to 
the work at EU level, and which consequences need to be drawn from the answer to this 
question. 
This is a question which should be addressed urgently, not only for the simple reason of 
respecting international obligations and human rights law, but also in order to avoid (very 
likely) court proceedings. With regard to the ‘terror lists’ and the obscure manner in which these 
lists are drawn up, the Council – after some years of a period of grace – has eventually come 
under well-pronounced criticism by the European Courts in Luxembourg. In the decision of 12 
December 2006, the Court of First Instance ruled that in relation to one listed group the Council 
act has infringed the right to a fair hearing, the obligation to state reasons and the right to 
effective judicial protection.
81 Contrary to the Court’s ruling, however, the Council has only 
reluctantly and half-heartedly started a process of altering its ‘terror list’ procedures.
82 In 
another most important decision of 27 February 2007, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (ECJ), in a complicated procedural context, opened up the possibility for national 
courts to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling in matters referring to third pillar fields of police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including ‘terror list’ issues.
83  
These developments highlight the fact that there is growing concern about the EU’s counter-
terrorism activities, not only among European and national parliamentarians, but also among 
European judges, as currently discussed by the Council of Ministers. An irresponsible and 
careless use of foreign torture information will only serve to nurture this – justified – concern. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations at EU level 
Recent investigations and inquiries on various levels have shed light on the illegal practice of 
extraordinary renditions and unlawful detention by foreign services on European territory. 
However, what has also been revealed is the fact that many European states and their security 
agencies cannot easily wash their hands of these incidents. Many indications suggest that the 
line between cooperation and complicity is only too often blurred. Apart from direct 
participation in extraordinary renditions or a reproachable ‘aversion of the eyes’ to the facts, 
                                                      
79 See Council of the European Union, EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, Council Doc. 5771/1/06 
Rev 1, 13.2.2006, p. 7, point 2.1. 
80 See above the different statements gathered at national level, 2.3. 
81 CFI, T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedin du peuple d’Iran v. Council of the European Union, 
12.12.2006. 
82 Cf. “EU’s terror list is hard to escape”, European Voice, 8-14 March 2007, p. 7; “EU backing down on 
terror list secrecy”, euobserver, 16.1.2007; see also EU Council Secretariat, Factsheet – Judgment by the 
Court of First Instance in the OMPI case T-228/02, no date. 
83 ECJ, C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro-Amnistía, Juan Mari Olano and Julen Zenarain Enarrasti v. Council of 
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some member states seem to have made indirect use of situations and ‘possibilities’ created by 
extraordinary renditions and unlawful detentions. This use essentially manifested itself in two 
variations: 1) interrogations carried out by member states agents in Guantánamo and other sites 
and 2) exchange and use of foreign torture information. 
This paper has argued that for various reasons member states should refrain from sending their 
agents to places where persons are unlawfully detained or made subject to extraordinary 
renditions, provided these interrogations do not serve to offer assistance to the detainees or aim 
at gathering evidence against the abductors. Concerning the use of foreign torture information, 
this paper concurs with a recent House of Lords judgment that such information may under no 
circumstances serve as admissible evidence in court. However, it differs from the judgment in 
so far as it poses a question mark over the Law Lords’ obiter dicta (and other official 
statements) that foreign torture information may be used without restrictions by governments 
and their services for executive activities. 
The implications of and for EU counter-terrorism activities was the issue of the second part of 
this paper. It is contended that while European institutions, namely the EP and recently the 
Court in Luxembourg, play a creditable role in trying to keep the EU on a lawful and legitimate 
track, there is no reason to relax these efforts. The EU’s counter-terrorism activities centre on 
the exchange and processing of information. Since jus cogens obligation in the context of 
torture prohibition, fundamental rights and the rule of law do bind EU institutional and 
individual actors, measures must be discussed and instigated to guarantee that the EU does not 
get entangled in unlawful behaviour by using and processing foreign torture information 
provided by member states’ security services. 
Building on these findings the following policy recommendations are put forward: 
1.  EU governments and their national authorities should work together and make all possible 
use of the existing EU counter-terrorism tools and cross-border cooperation mechanisms to 
support the ongoing investigations of some national prosecutors against those suspected of 
being involved in extraordinary renditions. 
2.  EU governments within the Council should address the issue of European involvement in 
the interrogation of detainees who have been abducted and/or unlawfully detained. A code 
of conduct should be drawn up that outlaws such interrogations. Visits of officials should 
only aim at offering assistance to the detainees or aim at gathering evidence against the 
abductors. 
3.  In the context of the follow-up discussions on the European Parliament resolution of 14 
February 2007 concerning CIA activities on European territory
84, the most likely eventuality 
– that foreign torture information was exchanged, stored and processed on EU level and that 
such information might serve as a basis for the adoption of EU acts and executive decisions 
– must be addressed.  
                                                      
84 With regard to the fact that neither the Council nor EU governments have so far officially reacted to 
this resolution, the EP civil liberties committee’s (LIBE) recent proposal to keep the topic on the agenda 
and to set up regular hearings on the progress during each Council presidency is an adequate step that 
deserves unconditional approval, see also “MEPs keep pressure on EU over CIA flights”, 
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4.  A second round of peer-evaluation of national arrangements in the fight against terrorism
85 
should be instigated. This second round, however, should not – as did the first - focus on the 
objective of how to make information exchange between law enforcement agencies within 
the EU more effective, but address instead the existing arrangements with non-EU 
intelligence and law enforcement services and the question of how these arrangements 
provide for the compliance with international law, human rights obligations and the rule of 
law. 
5.  The aim of this peer-evaluation should be the adoption of a common, EU-wide accord on 
the conditions of cooperation and intelligence sharing with foreign services, centring on the 
refusal to collaborate in or take advantage of torture or other unlawful treatment. As far as 
general principles of this common accord are concerned (rather than operational modes), the 
European Parliament must be involved in the debates.
86 
6.  In addition, a mechanism should be established to monitor the compliance with this 
common accord. This mechanism could take the form of a ‘yellow card, red card’ system: 
the transmission of tainted information in breach of the common accord will be followed by 
a warning (‘yellow card’) and in case of a repeated offence eventually by exclusion (‘red 
card’) of the information sharing network.
87 
7.  Democratic oversight and accountability of security services’ activities must be ensured.
88 
As both the national and EU level are concerned, a proposal that has already been made for 
the scrutiny of Europol’s work, appears to be the appropriate solution in this context: a joint 
committee composed of representatives from national parliaments or other bodies that 
control national intelligence services and the European Parliament.
89 In addition, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor could assist the work of the Committee and provide 
his opinion.
90  
                                                      
85 For the first round see G. de Vries, “The European Union’s role in the fight against terrorism”, Irish 
Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 16 (2005), pp. 3-9; Council decision of 28 November 2002 
establishing a mechanism for evaluating the legal systems and their implementation at national level in 
the fight against terrorism, OJ L 349, 24.12.2002, pp. 1-3; Council of the European Union, Final report 
on the evaluation of national anti-terrorism arrangements: Improving national machinery and capability 
for the fight against terrorism, Council doc. 12168/05, 26.9.2005. 
86 This common approach will eventually not only strengthen the position of EU intelligence and law 
enforcement services in the world but would – and this is even more important – reinforce the absolute 
prohibition of torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment. See also D. Bigo, Intelligence services, 
police and democratic control: the European and transatlantic collaboration, Briefing Paper, 13.7.2006, p. 
13, retrieved 27.3.2007 form www.libertysecurity.org.  
87 See D. Bigo, Intelligence services, police and democratic control: the European and transatlantic 
collaboration, Briefing Paper, 13.7.2006, p. 13, retrieved 27.3.2007 from www.libertysecurity.org.  
88 Cf. also the discussion that is currently taking place in Canada as a consequence of the secret service’s 
entanglement in unlawful behaviour, Commission of Inquiry into the actions of Canadian officials in 
relation to Maher Arar, A new review mechanism for the RCMP’s national security activities, 2006, 
retrieved 30.3.2007 from www.ararcommission.ca. 
89 Cf. with further references, B. Müller-Wille, SSR and European intelligence cooperation implications 
of the new security challenges and enlargement (both EU and NATO) for structuring European 
intelligence cooperation, as an important aspect of SSR, Conference paper, Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva June 2003, p. 5, retrieved 27.3.2007 from 
www.dcaf.ch.  
90 The bi-annual High Level Political Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism between the Council, the 
Commission, and the European Parliament Council of the European Union is a positive element, but does 
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8.  Regarding the EU financial sanction system, based on the so-called terror lists, the Council 
should enhance its efforts to revise and alter the procedures in order to comply with the 
Court of First Instance recent judgment.
91 This revision should include that in future every 
national decision to insert an individual or a group must be traceable. In addition, there 
should be an obligation to disclose – at least within the Council – the source that has 
provided the information upon which the suspicion against the individual or the entity is 
based. 
                                                                                                                                                            
cooperation with non-EU services. On this High Level Dialogue see, The European Union counter-
terrorism strategy: prevent, protect, pursue, respond – The European Union’s strategic commitment to 
combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to 
live in an area of freedom, security and justice, Council doc. 14469/4/05, 30.11.2005, p. 17. 
91 CFI, T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedin du peuple d’Iran v. Council of the European Union, 
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